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ABSTRACT
Evaluating anomaly detectors is a crucial task in traffic mon-
itoring made particularly difficult due to the lack of ground
truth. The goal of the present article is to assist researchers
in the evaluation of detectors by providing them with la-
beled anomaly traffic traces. We aim at automatically find-
ing anomalies in the MAWI archive using a new methodol-
ogy that combines different and independent detectors. A
key challenge is to compare the alarms raised by these de-
tectors, though they operate at different traffic granularities.
The main contribution is to propose a reliable graph-based
methodology that combines any anomaly detector outputs.
We evaluated four unsupervised combination strategies; the
best is the one that is based on dimensionality reduction. The
synergy between anomaly detectors permits to detect twice
as many anomalies as the most accurate detector, and to re-
ject numerous false positive alarms reported by the detectors.
Significant anomalous traffic features are extracted from re-
ported alarms, hence the labels assigned to the MAWI archive
are concise. The results on the MAWI traffic are publicly
available and updated daily. Also, this approach permits to
include the results of upcoming anomaly detectors so as to
improve over time the quality and variety of labels.
1. INTRODUCTION
Anomalies in Internet traffic penalize legitimate users from
accessing optimal network resources. Identifying anoma-
lous events is a crucial network management task that re-
quires automation. Consequently, anomaly detection has re-
ceived a lot of attention in the last decade, and numerous de-
tectors have been proposed. Operators, however, often dis-
regard the alarms reported by anomaly detectors because of
several drawbacks discrediting them [17, 30]. The key task
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for improving anomaly detectors is to thoroughly inspect re-
sults generated by such detectors and precisely identify any
drawbacks. However, identifying anomaly detectors vulner-
abilities is particularly difficult due to a lack of ground truth
data and of rigorous methodology. Hence, anomaly detec-
tors are evaluated by using distinct methodologies analyzing
traffic with real or simulated anomalies.
With real anomalies, researchers evaluate anomaly detec-
tors by manually checking the reported alarms [8, 11, 22,
23], or by comparing them to those reported by other anomaly
detectors [14, 21, 22, 23]. Sometimes researchers construct
ground truth data by manually inspecting the analyzed traf-
fic [4]. However, these evaluations are hardly comparable,
trustworthy, or reproducible, as they require significant hu-
man intervention and as traffic traces are usually inaccessible
due to privacy issues. Also, a common shortcoming of these
evaluation methodologies is the omission of the false nega-
tive rate of the detector, in spite of the fact that this metric is
the good indicator of the number of missed anomalies and of
the sensitivity of the detector to different kinds of anomalies.
Simulating anomalies is also a common way to evaluate
an anomaly detector [21, 27, 31, 32]. In this case, the pa-
rameters of anomalies are tunable (e.g., in intensity and time
duration), helping researchers to measure the sensitivity of
their detectors to particular kinds of anomalies. However,
simulating traffic as diverse as it is on the Internet is notori-
ously difficult [12], especially for anomalous traffic. Conse-
quently, the evaluation of a detector with simulated anoma-
lies is restricted to certain kinds of anomaly, and thus, is
insufficient for measuring the detector performance [29].
Ideally, an anomaly detector has to be evaluated using
ground truth data containing real and nonspecific traffic where
there is a wide range of anomalies. This ground truth data
should be publicly available to allow all researchers to access
the same data set and compare their results. Furthermore,
the data set should follow the evolution of the Internet traffic
to include traffic from emerging applications and anomalies.
Currently, there is no such crucial data with ground truth;
providing such data is our objective.
The goal is to find and label anomalies in the traffic from
the MAWI archive [9], and to make it available to researchers
so that they can refer to it while evaluating their own anomaly
detection methods. The main advantages of the MAWI archive
are that it is updated daily and it currently contains more
than nine years of real publicly available Internet traffic data.
However, manually labeling anomalies in such a large data
set is certainly impractical, and therefore, the challenge we
face is to accurately find anomalies in an automated and un-
supervised manner. The numerous anomaly detectors that
have recently been proposed in literature are the main sup-
port that will help us to reach the goal. Therefore, we are
selecting diverse anomaly detectors and combining their re-
sults to accurately find anomalies in the MAWI archive. The
synergy between detectors with different theoretical back-
grounds allows a more accurate level of detection to be achie-
ved. However, a key issue in combining such diverse detec-
tors is that they report different granularities of the traffic
that are difficult to rigorously compare.
The contribution of the present article is twofold. Firstly,
we establish a reliable methodology, which is based on graph
and community mining, that compares and combines the re-
sults from any anomaly detectors, even though they operate
at different traffic granularities. The proposed method out-
performs the combined detectors, and enables us to precisely
find twice as many anomalies as the most accurate detector
from the experiments. Secondly, results are made available
in the form of labeled data set, providing a benchmark for
anomaly detection methods. The database currently stands
for more than nine years of traffic and it is growing along
with the MAWI archive. Furthermore, this approach per-
mits the enhancement of the database over time by inte-
grating the results from emerging anomaly detectors. Thus,
the proposed database is constantly updated with new traf-
fic and anomaly detectors, and it is a valuable tool to assist
researchers designing anomaly detectors.
Related work. Providing ground truth data to evaluate ano-
maly detectors is a challenge that has been addressed sev-
eral times in the past. For example, the DARPA Intrusion
Detection Evaluation Program [24] has been a great effort
to provide labeled traffic to evaluate intrusion detection sys-
tems (IDS). It has been extensively studied, mainly through
the KDD Cup 1999 data (KDD’99), and has been a prof-
itable support for researchers. The main distinctions be-
tween this work and ours are the size of the network mea-
sured and the detectors to be evaluated. The DARPA Intru-
sion Detection Evaluation Program focuses on the evaluation
of IDS and provides labeled LAN traffic where the packet
payload is available and flows are complete. Whereas our
work focuses on the evaluation of backbone traffic anomaly
detectors and we provide labeled backbone traffic where the
packet payload is not available, and the flows are incomplete
and asymmetric. Furthermore, several critical drawbacks of
the KDD’99 have been reported [25]. Also, the traffic data
was captured in 1998, hence it contains no traffic from re-
cent applications or anomalies. Therefore, this data must be
carefully used as it is not representative of real traffic [34]
and does not contain recent anomalies.
Closer to our work, Owezarski [28] recently proposed a
data set containing real backbone traffic where anomalies are
precisely located. In this work the traffic is captured at dif-
ferent points in the RENATER network, which is supposed
to be anomaly free, and the researchers generate two kinds
of anomalies (i.e., flash crowd and DDoS attack). Their ex-
periment consist of different scenarios where the intensity of
the anomalies varies. Thus, the sensitivity of the detectors to
DDoS and flash crowd is easily identified. However, there
are only a few kinds of anomalies in their data and they are
not a realistic representation of the diverse anomalies found
on the Internet. Due to privacy issues, their data is not down-
loadable and only accessible by visiting their laboratory.
Being conscious of the shortcomings of previous works,
the data set is chosen and design to overcome these issues.
The proposed approach takes advantage of combination
strategies in order to merge the results from several detec-
tors. Although the combination of classifiers is a hot topic in
the clustering community [20], only a few works have been
conducted in the field of network anomaly detection. For
example, Shanbhag and Wolf [33] have studied the combi-
nation of five rate-based detectors to accurately identify the
real-time variance in traffic volume. They analyzed seven
different combination strategies and emphasize that the best
strategy improves the accuracy of the overall detectors. The
goal here differs from theirs as they aim at detecting anoma-
lies in real time by running several detectors in parallel. Thus,
they restrict their study to a particular kind of computation-
ally efficient anomaly detector (rate-based detector), whereas
our approach takes advantage of diverse anomaly detectors.
Another recent study on the combination of anomaly de-
tectors was conducted by Ashfaq et al. [3]. They propose
a new combination strategy that takes into account the ac-
curacy of the detectors; first, the accuracy of each detector
is evaluated on a training data set, and then, the results of
the detectors are combined regarding their accuracy. Their
results emphasized the benefit of taking into account the de-
tectors accuracies when combining them. Nevertheless, we
avoid such methods as they involve a training step that in-
creases the necessity of human intervention. The proposed
approach focuses on unsupervised anomaly detectors that
are combined with unsupervised combination strategies.
Proposed method. The method consists of four main steps,
executed for each traffic trace: (1) Several anomaly detectors
analyze the traffic and report alarms. (2) The similarities be-
tween the reported alarms are uncovered using a similarity
estimator that groups similar alarms into communities. (3)
Each community is investigated and classified by the com-
biner. Namely, the combiner decides if the community has
to be reported as anomalous, or ignored, depending on the
overall outputs of the detectors. (4) The anomalies are char-
acterized using association rule mining on the combiner re-
sults so as to label anomalies in the analyzed data set.
The paper is organized as follows: Steps 2 and 3 are de-
tailed in Section 2, and evaluated in Section 4. For that, the
data set and anomaly detectors that are used are depicted in
Section 3. Step 4 is described in Section 5. The results are
further discussed in Section 6 and we conclude in Section 7.
2. METHODOLOGY
2.1 Similarity estimator
Since the benefit of combining detectors relies on the di-
versity among the detectors ensemble, we combine various
anomaly detectors based on different theoretical backgrounds.
Nevertheless, these different anomaly detectors are inher-
ently reporting traffic at different granularities (e.g., flow,
host, or packet) that are difficult to systematically compare.
A detector might reports alarms at the host level, for example
A1 for IPX , and another detector reports alarms at the flow
level, for example B1 and B2 for < IPX , 80, IPY , 1234 >
and < IPX , 80, IPZ , 2345 >. In that case, A1 includes B1
and B2; however, telling that the three alarms are the same
is hard because B1 and B2 are obviously reporting distinct
traffic. Therefore, a rigorous method precisely measuring
the similarities between alarms is required.
The similarity estimator presented in this section is an ex-
tension of a previous work [13]. Its role is to uncover the
relations between the outputs of any kinds of anomaly de-
tector. First, it reads the alarms reported by the detectors
and the original traffic, and it extracts the traffic described by
each alarm. Second, it constructs a graph that highlights the
alarm similarities based on the traffic they have in common.
Finally, similar alarms are identified by finding communities
(i.e., dense connected components) in the graph.
2.1.1 Traffic extractor
The traffic extractor (called oracle in [13]) retrieves the
traffic described by each alarm. Let an alarm be a set of
traffic features that designates a particular traffic identified
by a detector. The traffic extractor records the association
between the alarm and this traffic. In [13], traffic associated
with given alarms is always a set of packets, whereas the
current work evaluates the benefits of associated traffic at
different granularities: either packet, or flow (unidirectional
or bidirectional). Figure 1 depicts the main differences in
using flows and packets. The three alarms in Fig. 1 report
three sets of packets from the same flow. By using packet as
the traffic granularity, we observe that Alarm2 and Alarm3
have traffic in common but no packet is shared with Alarm1.
Whereas using flow, the three alarms are reporting the same
traffic and thus will have similatities.
2.1.2 Graph generator
The graph generator uses the traffic retrieved by the traf-
fic extractor to build an undirected graph called similarity
graph, highlighting the similarities among all the alarms re-
ported by the detectors. In this graph, a node stands for an
alarm, and there is an edge between two nodes if their as-
Alarm1 Alarm2
Alarm3Packet Flow
Figure 1: A flow composed of packets corre-
sponding to three different alarms. Alarm2 and
Alarm3 have common packets, whereas Alarm1
consists of a distinct set of packets.
sociated traffic intersects. In addition, an edge is weighted
with a similarity measure that quantifies the traffic inter-
section of the two alarms it connects. Therefore, the simi-
larity measure enables to discriminate edges connecting dis-
similar alarms having an irrelevant number of packets or
flows in common. We selected three similarity measures for
the experiments: the Jaccard index, the Simpson index and
a constant function. Since the Simpson index outperformed
the two other metrics, and due to page limitation, only the
Simpson index is discussed in this article. The Simpson in-
dex is defined as
S(E1, E2) = |E1 ∩ E2|/min(|E1|, |E2|)
where Ei is the traffic associated with alarm i. This metric
ranges [0,1], where 0 means that the two traffic do not in-
tersect, and that the two alarms are fully dissimilar; 1 means
that they are identical or that one is included in the other.
2.1.3 Community mining
The similarity graph describes the alarm similarities, how-
ever alarms that are identical are not yet determined. Iden-
tical alarms are characterized in the graph as being a set of
strongly connected nodes: this is called a community. Iden-
tifying the communities in a graph is a problem that has been
extensively studied in the past [15]. Although numerous
community mining algorithms have been proposed, the in-
terest here focuses on those designed for sparse graph since
the generated graphs have disconnected nodes (e.g., a false
positive alarm reported by one detector). In the experiments,
we selected a method based on the modularity: the Louvain
algorithm [6]. This algorithm has the advantage of locally
identifying the communities, thus allowing us to identify
groups of a few alarms. Furthermore, this algorithm per-
forms a fast and accurate analysis of the graph [15].
2.2 Combiner
The similarity estimator clusters similar alarms into com-
munities: each community represents a set of distinct alarms
(i.e., nodes) reported by various detectors. The role of the
proposed combiner is to decide whether each community
corresponds to an anomalous traffic or not. For that, the
combiner classifies the communities into two categories, ac-
cepted and rejected, respectively standing for the communi-
ties reported as anomalous or those ignored. The class of a
community is determined by a combination strategy, adapted
from machine learning or pattern classifiers [20].
2.2.1 Background: combining detectors
A combination strategy is generally categorized as a de-
tector selection or an output fusion. On the one hand, de-
tector selection consists of selecting the detector that is the
most suitable for classifying an element (i.e., a community
in our case) and makes the same decisions as the single se-
lected detector. Since each element is analyzed by only one
detector, this approach is usually a good candidate for per-
forming a quick analysis. However, selecting an appropriate
detector is in practice challenging. In particular, the sensi-
tivity of detectors in the context of network anomaly detec-
tion is misunderstood and prevents us from applying such
techniques. On the other hand, output fusion makes no as-
sumption on the detectors as it inspects the results of all the
detectors. The output of a detector is assimilated to a vote
for a certain class, and the combination strategy refers to a
voting procedure.
In order to emphasize the advantages of combining de-
tectors with output fusion let us review perhaps the oldest
and best-known strategy, the majority vote. It is a basic, but
still powerful way, where the final decision is the simple ma-
jority of the detectors outputs (i.e., more than 50 percent of
the outputs). The probability of making the correct decision
with the majority vote depends on the probability of each
detector for providing the correct output, that is:
Pmaj(L) =
L∑
m=bL/2c+1
(
L
m
)
pm(1− p)L−m
where L is the number of detectors and p is their accuracy.
The result, also known as the Condorcet Jury Theorem, is as
follows; if p > 0.5, then Pmaj(L) is monotonically increas-
ing in L and Pmaj(L) → 1 as L → ∞. If p < 0.5, then
Pmaj(L) is monotonically decreasing in L and Pmaj(L)→
0 as L → ∞. If p = 0.5, then Pmaj(L) = 0.5 for any L.
This theorem highlights the benefit of combining reasonable
detectors (i.e., with an accuracy p > 0.5) over the use of a
single detector.
2.2.2 Application to traffic anomaly detection
Each anomaly detector outputs a binary value telling if a
traffic is anomalous or not. Namely, for each community in
the similarity graph, a detector votes for it being anomalous
if at least one of its alarms is in the community. Although
this is sufficient to compute a majority vote, this binary value
is too coarse for a precise combination. Also, the votes of the
detectors may significantly vary, depending on the tuning of
their parameters.
To prevent these difficulties we propose to score the con-
fidence of each vote of the detectors. Hereafter we refer to a
certain detector with a specific parameter set as a configu-
ration. Running a detector with several parameter sets and
measuring the variability of its output quantifies its parame-
ter sensitivity. The outputs of all configurations are merged
through the similarity estimator, and the variability in the
A0
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Figure 2: Example of community cex composed
of five alarms. Assuming that the input of the
similarity estimator, Xi, consists of the output
of three detectors X = A,B,C with three dif-
ferent parameter sets i = 0, 1, 2, then the con-
fidence scores are: ϕA(cex) = 0.66, ϕB(cex) = 1.0
and ϕC(cex) = 0.0.
outputs is computed by inspecting each community. The
confidence score ϕ of a detector d for a community c
is defined as:
ϕd(c) = φd(c)/Td
where Td is the total number of configurations with the de-
tector d and φd(c) is the number of these configurations that
reports at least one alarm belonging to the community c.
The confidence score is a continuous value that ranges [0,1],
0 representing that a given detector ignores the community
whereas 1 means that all configurations of the detector iden-
tify the community. For example, Fig. 2 is a community cex
composed of fives alarms. Assuming that the input of the
similarity estimator, Xi, consists of the output of nine con-
figurations corresponding to three detectors X = A,B,C
with three different parameter sets i = 0, 1, 2, then the con-
fidence scores for this community are: ϕA(cex) = 0.66,
ϕB(cex) = 1.0 and ϕC(cex) = 0.0.
2.2.3 Combination strategies
Average, Minimum, & Maximum. Let us now present
three different combination strategies that aggregate the con-
fidence scores relative to a given community c in a value
µ(c) , and classify a community c as accepted (i.e., labeled
anomalous) only if µ(c) > 0.5.
Aggregating the confidences score of a community by av-
erage allows us to rely equally on the votes of all the detec-
tors. Formally, for a community c and using L detectors, the
average is: µ(c) = 1L
∑L
i=1 ϕi(c). In the example shown in
Fig. 2 the average of all the confidence scores equals 5/9,
and thus, this combination strategy would classify the com-
munity cex as accepted.
Another strategy consists in selecting the minimum con-
fidence score. This pessimistic decision classify a commu-
nity as accepted only if all the detectors support this deci-
sion. Consequently, the ratio of false positive is substantially
reduced at the cost of an increase in the ratio of true negative.
Formally, the decision made for the community c depends on
its minimum confidence score: µ(c) = mini{ϕi(c)}. In the
example shown in Fig. 2, the minimum of all the confidence
scores is 0, and thus, this combination strategy would clas-
sify the community cex as rejected.
On the contrary, a third strategy is to select the maximum
confidence score. This optimistic decision classify a com-
munity as accepted only if at least one detector supports this
decision. Consequently, the ratio of true positive is substan-
tially increased, but so is the ratio of false positive. For-
mally, the decision made for the community c depends on its
maximum confidence score: µ(c) = maxi{ϕi(c)}. In the
example shown in Fig. 2, the maximum of all confidence
scores is 1, and thus, this combination strategy would clas-
sify the community cex as accepted.
Correspondence analysis: SCANN. Correspondence anal-
ysis [5] is a multivariate statistical technique for analyzing
multiway tables. It represents a data set in a lower-dimensional
space based on its singular value decomposition. Although
its role is similar to the principal component analysis one,
correspondence analysis is designed for categorical data.
Using correspondence analysis, Merz [26] proposes an
unsupervised combination strategy called SCANN that is
used here as an alternative combination strategy. This method
stores all the decisions of the detectors in a table, such that
each entry is a vector representing the votes of all detectors
for a certain community. Then, using correspondence anal-
ysis, this table is reduced such that the entries are smaller
vectors containing only the main features characterizing the
detectors votes. The benefit is that the reduced table contains
only the significant votes. For instance, an irrelevant detec-
tor is one constantly making the same vote; in the first table
built by SCANN, such a detector’s votes are constant values,
hence they will be ignored in the reduced table because they
do not help for discriminating between the communities.
The reduced table contains the characteristics of each com-
munity in a low-dimensional space. Onto this low-dimensio-
nal space, SCANN projects two reference points which are
two representative communities unanimously reported by the
detectors as accepted, or as rejected. The class of each com-
munity is then determined according to which representative
community the closest in the low-dimensional space.
Note that, since correspondence analysis is designed for
categorical data, SCANN is unable to deal with the confi-
dence scores previously defined. In order to take advantage
of different configurations, the implementation of SCANN
that is used consider directly the binary outputs of different
configurations as its input.
3. DATA SET AND ANOMALY DETECTORS
3.1 Data set
The traffic we are labeling is from the MAWI (Measure-
ment and Analysis on the WIDE Internet) archive sample-
points B and F [9]. This archive contains daily traces rep-
resenting 15 minutes of traffic captured from a trans-Pacific
link between Japan and the United States. The data is pub-
licly available; packet payloads are omitted and IP addresses
are anonymized. MAWI started in January 2001, and thus,
currently contains more than 9 years of traffic. Since 2001,
the link has been updated three times, originally it was an
18 Mbps CAR on a 100 Mbps link, but it was updated to
a full 100 Mbps link in 2006/07/01 and is currently a 150
Mbps link since June 2007. MAWI has enabled researchers
to study Internet traffic characteristics [7, 16, 19], anomaly
detectors [11, 14], and traffic classifiers [10].
In the experiments, the similarity estimator is evaluated
with the traffic traces from the first week of every month
from 2001 to 2009, whereas the combiner is evaluated using
all the traffic traces from 2001 to 2009.
3.2 Anomaly detectors
Four unsupervised anomaly detectors, based on distinct
statistical-analysis techniques, are implemented. As they re-
port traffic at different granularities, the proposed similarity
estimator is necessary to compare their results. The con-
fidence score for each detector is obtained by tuning them
with three different parameter sets corresponding to optimal,
sensitive or conservative setting. Hence, for experiment, the
input for the proposed method consists in the 12 outputs of
all the configurations (4 detectors using 3 parameter tun-
ings). The main ideas of the four detectors are as follows.
(1) Principal component analysis (PCA) is an unsuper-
vised technique highlighting the main features of the data.
This is perhaps the most studied technique for anomaly de-
tection in backbone traffic. It was first applied by Lakhina
et al. [21], and it has received much attention in the last
few years [23, 30, 31]. The key idea underlying a PCA-
based anomaly detector is the extraction of the main fea-
tures defining a normal traffic behavior using PCA, then the
distinct traffic is reported as anomalous. An inherent prob-
lem with PCA-based detectors is the retrieval of the original
traffic features of the anomalous traffic [30]. In the experi-
ments we overcame this difficulty by using random projec-
tion techniques (sketches) [23, 18]. This approach enables
the PCA-based detector to report the source IP address of
the identified anomalous traffic.
(2) Dewaele et al. introduced an anomaly detection method
based on sketching and multi-resolution gamma modeling
[11]. In a nutshell, the traffic is split into sketches and mod-
eled using Gamma distribution. Traffic that is distant from
an adaptively computed reference is reported as anomalous.
The sketches are computed twice; the traffic is hashed on
source addresses and destination addresses. Thus, this method
reports source or destination IP addresses.
(3) The Hough transform is a pattern recognition tech-
nique that allows for the identification of a specific shape
in a picture. This technique has been applied to several do-
mains including anomaly detection of backbone traffic [14].
The approach proposed in [14] consists of first, monitoring
the traffic in a 2-D scatter plot where the anomalous traffic
appears as “lines”, and second, identifies the anomalies with
the Hough transform. The original data is retrieved from the
identified plots, and the alarms reported by this method are
aggregated sets of flows.
(4) The work presented in [8] detected the prominent chan-
ges in traffic by applying the Kullback-Leibler (KL) diver-
gence to several kinds of histograms that monitor distinct
traffic features. Then, association rule mining allows for
the extraction of the set of traffic features that describes the
anomalies detected by the histograms. Thus, the alarms re-
ported by this anomaly detector are association rules, namely
4-tuples (source and destination IP addresses, source and
destination port numbers) where elements can be omitted.
4. EVALUATION
4.1 Similarity estimator
In this section the proposed similarity estimator is evalu-
ated using the alarms reported by the twelve configurations.
In particular, the sensitivity of the similarity estimator to the
traffic granularity is discussed.
4.1.1 Metrics for evaluation
The following tools enable a comparison of the results
given by different configurations of the similarity estimator,
and a validation of its efficiency.
Size of communities. The size of a community is the num-
ber of nodes that belong to that community, that is the num-
ber of similar alarms clustered in the community. We distin-
guish a specific class of community, called the single com-
munities, that is the size 1 communities (communities with
a single alarm). An alarm falls into a single community if
the similarity estimator fails to find other alarms related to
it. Consequently, we expect a good similarity estimator to
minimize the number of single communities.
Obviously, the number of single communities is not a suf-
ficient scale to evaluate the similarity estimator, as it reports
a value 0 when all the alarms are connected regardless of
their similarities. Consequently, we also score the relevance
of the communities using association rule mining.
Traffic summary with association rules. One key task
for validating the efficiency of the proposed similarity esti-
mator is to inspect the traffic corresponding to each commu-
nity. The goal of this inspection is to assess that each com-
munity is a group of related alarms standing for the traffic
with common features; this is a similar goal to the domi-
nant state analysis presented in [35], or the association
rule mining of [8].
The traffic related to each community is profiled here us-
ing an association rule mining algorithm that finds sets of
features, which are called rules, describing the prominent
trends in a given list of properties. We choose the Apriori
[2] algorithm as it is a well-known algorithm for achieving
association rule mining. The Apriori algorithm efficiently
counts the candidate rules in a breadth-first search manner.
It finds all the rules that describe more than s elements of
the data, where s is the only parameter of this algorithm. We
slightly modify the Apriori algorithm to express s in a per-
Table 1: Heuristics labeling the traffic corre-
sponding to a community into three categories
(“Attack”, “Special”, and “Unknown”). These
are originated from the anomalies previously
reported [7, 14] and the manual inspection of
MAWI.
Label Category Details
Attack Sasser Traffic on ports 1023/tcp, 5554/tcp
or 9898/tcp
Attack RPC Traffic on port 135/tcp
Attack SMB Traffic on port 445/tcp
Attack Ping High ICMP traffic
Attack Other Traffic with more than 7 packets and:
attacks SYN, RST or FIN flag ≥ 50%
Or, http, ftp, ssh, dns traffic with
SYN flag ≥ 30%
Attack NetBIOS Traffic on ports 137/udp or 139/tcp
Special Http Traffic on ports 80/tcp and 8080/tcp
with less than 30% of SYN flag
Special dns, ftp, Traffic on ports 20/tcp, 21/tcp,
ssh 22/tcp or 53/tcp&udp with less
than 30% of SYN flag
Unknown Unknown Traffic that does not match
other heuristics
centage rather than a fixed number of elements. For instance,
the modified version of Apriori computed with s = 20%
outputs each rule that describes at least 20% of the data.
In the experiments, the modified version of Apriori is ar-
bitrarily tuned with s = 20%, and it analyzes the packets or
flows corresponding to each community. Thereby, the result-
ing rules describe the main characteristics of the traffic cor-
responding to a community in the form of 4-tuples — source
IP address, source port number, destination IP address, desti-
nation port number. For example, a community correspond-
ing to the traffic from a HTTP server IPA to two hosts, IPB
and IPC, is depicted by the rules < IPA, 80, IPB, ∗ >
and < IPA, 80, IPC, ∗ >, where ∗ means that no specific
destination port was identified.
The relevance of a community as a set of alarms is quan-
tified by two efficiency metrics based on its rules:
• The rule degree of a community is the average num-
ber of items in its rules. For example, if a commu-
nity has the two following rules, < IPA, ∗, IPB, ∗ >
and < IPA, 80, IPC, 12345 >, then its rule degree
is (2 + 4)/2 = 3. The rule degree ranges [0, 4], and
values close to 4 mean that the rules are specific, and
thus, correspond to a particular kind of traffic, whereas
values close to 0 mean that the mining rule algorithm
failed to characterize specificities of the traffic.
• The rule support of a community is the percentage
of data covered by all the rules of this community. For
instance, if the two previous rules cover, respectively,
50% and 25% of the traffic captured by the community,
and because the rules are disjoint, then the rule support
is 50 + 25 = 75%.
Traffic inspection. The heuristics of Table 1 help to char-
acterize traffic corresponding to communities. These heuris-
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Figure 3: Characteristics of communities reported by the similarity estimator with different traffic
granularities.
tics are designed from previous works [7, 14] and the manual
inspection of the MAWI traffic. They assign three general la-
bels to the traffic, “Attack”, “Special”, or “Unknown”, high-
lighting the type of traffic corresponding to a community.
Furthermore, they inspect only the TCP flag, ICMP code,
and port number related information, and allow us to con-
duct a fair evaluation as they are independent of the mecha-
nisms of the chosen detectors.
4.1.2 Results
The similarity estimator is evaluated using three distinct
traffic granularities (packet, unidirectional flow, and bidirec-
tional flow) by looking at the size of the communities and by
inspecting the traffic corresponding to it.
Size of communities. The results highlight the benefit of
flows to uncover similar alarms as Fig. 3(a) depicts a sub-
stantial decrease in the number of single communities us-
ing unidirectional or bidirectional flows. In addition, we ob-
served a significant increase in the size of the communities
when using bidirectional flows (Fig. 3(b)). These obser-
vations emphasize the ability of the similarity estimator to
relate more alarms using flows.
Traffic summary. Let us check the consistency of the com-
munities, that is whether all the alarms of the same com-
munity are actually related. Community consistency is an-
alyzed using the rules that are assigned to each commu-
nity by the modified Apriori algorithm. Figure 3(c) shows
that the best rule support is achieved by using unidirectional
flow, and the results obtained when using bidirectional flows
are slightly inferior. By using unidirectional flows more
than 50% of the communities have the rule support equal to
100%. However, the results are different regarding the rule
degree (Fig.3(d)); the most accurate rules are obtained us-
ing packets whereas the least accurate are from bidirectional
flows. We observe about 18% of the communities found us-
ing bidirectional flows are described with rules having only
one traffic feature.
To understand which communities are suffering from coarse
rules, thus containing dissimilar alarms, we investigated the
relation between the size of communities and the rules effi-
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ciency. Figure 4 is the rule support, rule degree, and com-
munity size obtained when using unidirectional flows. We
observe that the largest communities tend to have a rule de-
gree equal to 1 and a rule support equal to 100%. A man-
ual inspection of these communities reveals that they have
coarse rules reporting a single traffic feature, usually a well
known port such as 80 or 53 (Fig. 5). However 90% of the
communities, namely with less than 20 nodes (Fig. 3(b)),
have a rule degree higher than 2 and a rule support higher
than 75% (Fig. 4). Similar observations are made using
bidirectional flows, whereas using packets the rule degree is
higher than 2.5 and the rule support above 70%. Therefore,
the consistency of the communities identified the the similar-
ity detector is satisfactory for the three traffic granularities.
Selecting a traffic granularity is a trade off between the size
of the communities and their consistency.
Traffic inspection. Figure 5 depicts the intersections of the
detectors outputs and the type of corresponding traffic. The
main results are: (1) The intersection of the four detectors
is significantly small in comparison to the total number of
identified communities, therefore, the four detectors are sen-
sitive to distinct traffic; (2) The number of single communi-
ties containing one alarm only from the PCA-based detector
is significantly high, while only a few single communities
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Figure 6: PDF of attack ratio for four combination strategies and four detectors evaluated on 9 years.
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are reported by the KL-based detector. Furthermore, 6% of
the single communities identified by the PCA-based detec-
tor are labeled “Attack” whereas this ratio is significantly
higher for other detectors: 33% for Hough, 22% for Gamma
and 56% for KL. We also observe that the PCA-based detec-
tor represents 58% of the non-single communities identified
by one detector. Thus, the output of the PCA-based is sep-
arated from others and its detection ratio is low in terms of
the heuristics of Table 1. Regarding the communities identi-
fied by more than one detector, their attack ratio increases in
tandem with the number of detectors identifying them.
The communities identified by several detectors certainly
highlight anomalous traffic that have to be reported by the
combiner. Nevertheless, the communities reported by a sin-
gle detector have to be thoroughly investigated as they per-
haps stand for anomalous traffic, particularly for those re-
ported by the Hough, Gamma and KL-based detector.
4.2 Combiner
4.2.1 Attack ratio
In this work, measuring the accuracy of the four combi-
nation strategies is a contradictory task due to the lack of
ground truth data. We bypass this issue by inspecting the
results of the combiner with the heuristics of Table 1.
The heuristics label the communities reported by the sim-
ilarity estimator into three groups: “Attack”, “Special”, and
“Unknown”. Since a relevant combination strategy is pre-
sumed to report the largest proportion of the communities
labeled “Attack”, we define the attack ratio as the amount
of communities labeled “Attack” divided by the total number
of identified communities. The combination strategies are
expected to also report numerous communities labeled “Spe-
cial” or “Unknown”, thus low attack ratio, as the proposed
heuristics might label incorrectly several kinds of anomalies.
Nevertheless, the attack ratio is a reliable indicator that helps
us to identify the best combination strategy, that is the one
accepting the highest ratio of communities labeled “Attack”
(Fig. 6(a) and 7(a)) and rejecting the lowest ratio of commu-
nities labeled “Attack” (Fig. 6(b) and 7(b)).
4.2.2 Comparison of combining strategies
This section evaluates the ability of the four combination
strategies to label communities. The analyzed communities
are produced by the similarity estimator with the alarms re-
ported by the four detectors on nine years of MAWI traffic
and using unidirectional flow as traffic granularity. These
communities are classified by the combination strategies into
two classes (i.e., accepted and rejected) and the attack ratio
of both classes are computed for each day of the analyzed
traffic. Probability density functions (Fig. 6) and time-series
of the attack ratio (Fig. 7) are displayed.
Regarding accepted communities, the best combination
strategy is SCANN as it features the largest probability for
highest attack ratio (Fig. 6(a)). Nevertheless, the best com-
bination strategy regarding rejected communities is themax-
imum strategy because it has the largest probability for low-
est attack ratio (Fig. 6(a)). Since the prominent variance
between the attack ratio probability of the accepted commu-
nities and the one of the rejected communities highlights the
best combination strategy, the experiments support SCANN
as the best strategy for discriminating the communities rep-
resenting anomalous traffic.
The probability density functions of the four anomaly de-
tectors attack ratio emphasizes that all detectors, except the
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Figure 7: Attack ratio of four combining strate-
gies for nine years of MAWI traffic.
KL-based one, have an average attack ratio that is inferior to
SCANN (Fig. 6(c)). Although the KL-based detector attack
ratio is close to that of SCANN, the thorough investigation
of the SCANN output in Section 4.2.3 asserts that SCANN
detected twice more traffic than the KL-based detector.
The time evolution of the attack ratio for each combina-
tion strategy is depicted in Figures 7(a) and 7(b). Although
the SCANN algorithm is not constantly outperforming the
other combination strategies, it never has the worst attack
ratio. The low attack ratio of both the accepted and rejected
communities from 2007 is due to the simple heuristics listed
in Table 1 that mislabeled the numerous elephant flows from
peer-to-peer traffic and other anomalies using random ports.
Still, between 2007 and 2010, the efficiency of SCANN is
noticeable as its attack ratio for accepted communities was 2
to 3 times higher than the one for rejected communities.
However, the increase in the attack ratio for rejected com-
munities from 2003 to 2005 (Fig. 7(b)) highlights the par-
ticular traffic that is missed by the combination strategies.
The release of the Blaster worm in August 2003 followed by
the release of the Sasser worm in May 2004 were two of the
main events reported during this time period [7]. These two
worms have substantially affected the main characteristics
of the traffic and the four detectors were differently affected
by this variance in traffic. The detectors reported numer-
ous alarms that were not related to those of the other detec-
tors, and consequently, the combiner failed in distinguishing
several anomalous traffic. Nevertheless, this shortcoming of
the combiner is inherently diminished by the combination
of more detectors thus increasing the intersection of their
outputs. Furthermore, we observed that selecting a single
detector to analyze this traffic was also challenging, as the
attack ratio of each detector critically fluctuated during this
time period.
Table 2: Four measures quantifying benefits and
losses when using SCANN
SCANN
Accepted Rejected
Label
Attack gainacc costrej
Special, Unknown costacc gainrej
4.2.3 Inspecting the SCANN output
We evaluate the benefits and the losses of using SCANN
based on the four quantities depicted in Table 2. For rejected
communities the gainrej is the amount of communities that
are labeled “Special” or “Unknown”, whereas the costrej
is those labeled “Attack”. Symmetrically, for the accepted
communities, the gainacc is the amount of communities that
are labeled “Attack”, whereas the costacc is those labeled
“Special” or “Unknown”.
Rejected communities. Figure 8 shows the breakout of com-
munities classified by the SCANN algorithm. The two left-
hand side plots are the communities rejected by SCANN
where the alarms reported by the Hough- and the Gamma-
based detectors are highlighted. The gainrej for the Gamma-
based detector (Fig. 8(a)) is substantial and stands for more
than half of the overall gainrej for all the detectors. Never-
theless, the high true positive rate of the Gamma-based de-
tector is emphasized by its costrej , which represents most of
the communities labeled “Attack” and rejected by SCANN.
The gainrej of the Hough-based detector was slightly higher
than its costrej exhibiting the low false positive rate of this
detector. In addition, Figure 8(b) depicts the high sensitivity
of this detector to worm spreading (i.e., Blaster during 2003
and Sasser during 2004). The results for the PCA and KL-
based detectors are omitted, as the former one has a signifi-
cant gainrej that is close to the overall gainrej , and the latter
one has no costrej and an negligible gainrej . The experi-
ments also exhibited the contamination of the normal sub-
space of the PCA-based detector [31] by the first release of
the Sasser worm, and thus, a considerable gainrej for this
detector at this time period.
The PCA-based detector reported a significant number of
alarms that were mostly unrelated to the alarms of other de-
tectors (Fig. 5), particularly after the MAWI link update at
the end of 2006 (overall gainrej in Fig 8(a)). Since SCANN
rejected most of the communities reported only by the PCA-
based detector, the number of communities rejected by SCANN
was notably higher than those of the accepted one (Fig. 8(b)
and 8(c)). Figures 8(b) and 8(c) suggest that the overall
costrej was higher than the overall gainacc. However, we
emphasize that the communities accepted by SCANN are
more significant, in terms of the number of alarms and the
amount of corresponding traffic, than the rejected ones.
Accepted communities. A manual inspection of the SCANN
output reveals that several accepted communities contain only
alarms from a single detector. Therefore, for the nine years
of analyzed traffic, 8 accepted communities were identified
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Figure 8: Communities classified by SCANN as rejected with the alarms from the Hough (a) and the
Gamma-based (b) detectors highlighted, and the communities accepted by SCANN with the alarms
from the KL-based detector highlighted (c).
by only the PCA-based detector, 325 accepted communities
were identified by only the Gamma-based detector, 2467
accepted communities were identified by only the Hough-
based detector, and 352 accepted communities were iden-
tified by only the KL-based detector. Meaning that 82%
of the communities reported exclusively by the KL-based
detector are accepted by SCANN. This highlights the ad-
vantage of SCANN over the average combination strategy.
Whereas the average combination strategy inherently rejects
all the communities reported by a single detector, SCANN
performs a finer analysis that emphasizes the output from ac-
curate detectors and allows for the acceptance of small com-
munities identified exclusively by these detectors. Indeed,
the SCANN algorithm factorizes the detectors decisions by
disregarding the unnecessary ones, thus, SCANN ignores the
output of the detectors that are making irrelevant decisions
and emphasizes the other results. For example, in the exper-
iments the PCA-based detector output was mainly separated
from the outputs of the other detectors (the single commu-
nities in Fig. 5). Consequently, SCANN frequently disre-
garded the PCA-based detector and accepted only 8 of the
numerous communities exclusively identified by this detec-
tor. Conversely, the Hough-based detector reports more rel-
evant alarms as many are related to those from other detec-
tors, and thus, SCANN selects 2467 communities reported
by only this detector.
In the experiments the best detector was the KL-based
one (Fig. 6(c)). Almost all the alarms from this detector
were related to another alarm (Fig. 5) and are accepted by
SCANN. However, about 50% of the communities accepted
by SCANN and labeled “Attack” are not identified by the
KL-based detector (Fig. 8(c) and 9). These communities are
mainly reported by the three other detectors and they high-
light the high false negative rate (i.e., anomalies missed) of
the KL-based detector (Fig. 9).
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SCANN low dimensional space. Combining the four de-
tectors with SCANN allows us to improve the results of the
most accurate detector and to ignore the false alarms re-
ported by all the detectors. However, Fig. 7(b) suggests that
it misclassified several communities. As described in Sec-
tion 2.2.3, the SCANN algorithm maps the communities in
a reduced space and classifies them based on their distances
to two reference points. Let dacc and drej be the distance
from a community to the reference point standing for, re-
spectively, accepted and rejected communities, then the rela-
tive distance of the community is defined as (drej/dacc)−1.
This metric ranges [0,∞), where 0 means that the commu-
nity is on the threshold whereas higher values highlight the
communities that are distant to it. The inspection of the
rejected communities exhibits that the relative distance of
those labeled “Attack” is lower than the one of those labeled
“Special” or “Unknown” (Fig. 10).
We varied the discriminating threshold of SCANN dur-
ing the experiments to investigate possible improvements.
Tuning the threshold to accept more communities tends to
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increase the fluctuations of the attack ratio of SCANN. For
example, accepting all the communities within a relative dis-
tance of 0.5 achieved an attack ratio of 0.7 during the Sasser
outbreak, but sometimes deteriorated the attack ratio, there-
fore, no global improvement was observed.
5. MAWI LABELING
Step 4 of the proposed method consists in labeling the an-
alyzed traffic, here the MAWI archive. In agreement with the
previous evaluation, the traffic is labeled using the SCANN
combination strategy, and the similarity estimator was exe-
cuted using unidirectional flow. Since several communities
contained a significant number of alarms, we retrieved the
common traffic features corresponding to all the alarms from
the same community with the association rule mining algo-
rithm presented in Section 4.1.1, and assigned labels to the
traffic described by the community rules.
Using the SCANN output we define a simple traffic tax-
onomy with four different labels: Anomalous, Suspicious,
Notice, and Benign. The traffic accepted by SCANN is la-
beled Anomalous, meaning that these traffic are abnormal
and should be identified by any efficient anomaly detector.
The traffic rejected by SCANN and having a relative dis-
tance lower or equal to 0.5 is labeled Suspicious. Most of
these traffic are probably anomalous but are not clearly iden-
tified. The traffic also rejected by SCANN but having a rel-
ative distance greater than 0.5 is labeled Notice. Although
these traffic are not anomalous and should not be identified
by any anomaly detector, we do not label them as benign in
order to trace all the alarms reported by the combined detec-
tors. The other traffic is labeled Benign because none of the
anomaly detectors identified it.
This labeling of the MAWI traffic is publicly available in
the form of a database named MAWILab [1]. This database
assists researchers in measuring the detection rate of their
anomaly detector. The results of the emerging detectors can
be accurately compared to the labels of MAWILab by using
a similarity estimator like the one presented in this work.
6. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
In addition to its accurate detection, the proposed method
has several advantages that are presented in this section.
The graph-based similarity estimator proposed in Section
2.1 is a valuable support for systematically benchmarking a
detector against other detectors that report traffic at a dif-
ferent granularity. Indeed, by clustering diverse detectors
alarms into communities, it allows the automated inspection
of numerous detectors outputs in a rigorous manner.
Also, the community rules obtained from the rule mining
algorithm consist of concise descriptions of the traffic identi-
fied by the numerous alarms being merged into the commu-
nities. Therefore, an anomalous traffic reported by numer-
ous similar alarms is annotated with a single label. Thus, the
number of labels assigned to the MAWI archive is signifi-
cantly inferior to the number of alarms reported by the four
detectors, and the labels are intelligible to humans.
Following the expansion of the MAWI archive, MAW-
ILab is updated daily to track the latest trends in Internet
traffic and upcoming anomalies. Furthermore, we will also
take into account the results from emerging anomaly detec-
tors, to improve the quality and variety of the labels over
time. Indeed, by including new results from upcoming de-
tectors the overlaps of the detectors outputs are emphasized
and the accuracy of SCANN is improved. Therefore, MAW-
ILab is constantly enhanced and represents a reference data
set over time. In order to ease the evolution of MAWILab,
we are planning to establish a collaborative system allowing
researchers to easily contribute by submitting their anomaly
detector or results.
We emphasize that the proposed implementation has the
advantage of handling manual annotations or annotations from
traffic classifiers [10]. Indeed, the similarity estimator is
able to deal with any traffic annotations [13] containing at
least two timestamps and one traffic feature. This significant
ability of the approach allows us to label traffic with an ex-
haustive taxonomy. For instance, by adding in the method
input the annotations from a traffic classifier, the similarity
estimator aggregates similar alarms and corresponding an-
notations in the same community. Afterwards, the combiner
classifies the communities by ignoring the annotations, but
the accepted communities are still reported with the extra
information provided by the annotation.
The goal of this work is to find and label traffic anomalies
off-line, so we assume no constraint is placed on the exe-
cution time of the approach. Nevertheless, the experiments
revealed that the current implementation requires only a few
minutes to combine alarms with a 15-minute traffic trace,
thus enabling for real time analysis. However, the study of
concurrently running anomaly detectors in real time is left
for future work.
Furthermore, we are also interested in studying the sensi-
tivities of the anomaly detectors to estimate the best candi-
dates to combine and to evaluate the combination strategies
based on detector selection.
7. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a methodology that find network traffic anoma-
lies in the MAWI archive by comparing and combining the
results from four anomaly detectors. The approach consists
of two main ingredients; first, a graph-based similarity es-
timator systematically uncovers the relations between the
alarms reported by the detectors, second, a combiner clas-
sifies the similar alarms using a combination strategy. We
evaluated the effectiveness of both using different traffic ag-
gregations and combination strategies. The experiments em-
phasized the benefit of combining detectors with SCANN,
a strategy based on dimensionality reduction, as it ignored
irrelevant alarms and detected twice more anomalous traffic
than the more accurate combined detector.
The established methodology allows us to accurately de-
tect anomalies in the MAWI archive and precisely assign
concise labels. The results are updated daily using the MAWI
archive and are publicly available [1] to assist researchers in
benchmarking their detectors. We encourage researchers to
contribute to the proposed system by submitting to us their
results or detectors, so we can maintain a reliable labeling of
the MAWI archive.
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